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Abstract 
Dominoes is a partially observable extensive form game with probability.  The 
rules are simple; however, complexity and uncertainty of this game make it difficult to 
apply standard game theoretic methods to solve.  This thesis applies strategy prediction 
opponent modeling to work with game theoretic search algorithms in the game of two 
player dominoes.  This research also applies methods to compute the upper bound 
potential that predicting a strategy can provide towards specific strategy types. 
Furthermore, the actual values are computed according to the accuracy of a trained 
classifier.  Empirical results show that there is a potential value gain over a Nash 
equilibrium player in score for fully and partially observable environments for specific 
strategy types.  The actual value gained is positive for a fully observable environment for 
score and total wins and ties.  Actual value gained over the Nash equilibrium player from 
the opponent model only exist for score, while the opponent modeler demonstrates a 
higher potential to win and/or tie in comparison to a pure game theoretic agent. 
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OUTPERFORMING GAME THEORETIC PLAY WITH OPPONENT 
MODELING IN TWO PLAYER DOMINOES 
I.  Introduction 
Problem Statement 
The game of dominoes is a partially observable extensive form game (or POEFG) 
with probability.  An extensive form game is a game in which each player takes an action 
and there are payoffs as a result of the actions made [22].  The rules (found in Appendix 
A) are simple.  With its numeric tile structure and straightforward rule set, dominoes is a 
resizable game which allows researchers to examine simple to very complex versions of 
POEFG’s with probability by only adjusting a few parameters in the game.   
Dominoes is also probabilistic nature.  The rules state that there is a boneyard (i.e. 
the pile of faced down dominoes) that players pull from when there is no available play.  
This adds the element of chance to the game tree.  Moreover, players can only view their 
hand of play and the contents on the board.  They cannot see their opponents’ hands or 
the boneyard. 
The goal of this research is to produce an opponent modeling algorithm that can 
predict an opponent’s style of play as well as provide an optimal move in a partially 
observable environment with probability.  This research focuses on choosing optimal 
moves by exploiting the opponent’s strategy in place of applying the Nash equilibrium 
solution.  (Nash equilibrium is achieved when a player, given strategies of other players 
in the same game, has nothing to gain by unilaterally switching his strategy [25].)    
Common algorithms like MiniMax (explained in Chapter 2) apply a Nash Equilibrium 
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(NE) solution to select optimal moves. This research evaluates the expected and actual 
gain in value that a specific opponent modeler provides over a NE solution for the game 
of two player dominoes.  The next section outlines the complexity of dominoes as well as 
how this game is simplified to perform this research. 
Complexity of Dominoes 
There are several factors that influence computational complexity in dominoes.  
The first element of complexity involves the branching factor because the larger the 
branching factor becomes, the longer a decision engine has to search to find the best 
action. (Often the growth rate is much worse than linear and often even worse than 
polynomial).  The number of starting states also makes a big impact on the game because 
unlike many board games such as tic-tac-toe and chess, dominoes bears billions of 
starting states (as illustrated in Table 1 and Equation 2).  Lastly, dominoes is a game of 
partial observability where many aspects of the game are hidden.  Furthermore, dominoes 
adds probability with boneyard pulls.  All of these issues make solving dominoes a hard 
problem. 
Branching Factor.  
The branching factor of dominoes is calculated by examining the number of 
possible actions or moves per turn.  This number involves the number of dominoes in a 
player’s hand and the number of places that a domino can be positioned on the board.  
Additionally, a domino can be placed in more than one location depending on the domino 
and the player’s strategy.  Figure 1 illustrates how dominoes can be placed on the left or 
right side of the spinner, (the first domino placed on the board.)   
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Figure 1:  Example instance of double-6 dominoes game tree where the opponent has all 
possible responses to spinner. 
 
This factor multiplies the branching factor by up to four depending on legal plays 
available. 
Starting State.  
The starting state of dominoes is important in comparing this game with fully 
observable board games such as chess because board games tend to only have a single 
starting position.  Dominoes is interesting because the starting state possibilities change 
depending on the number of players in the game and the size (or number of dominoes) of 
the set.  Games like poker also have multiple start states; however, unlike poker 
dominoes has multiple payouts throughout the game instead of one main payout at the 
end of a hand. 
To calculate the number of starting states in two player dominoes, the set size 
must be found first.  The set size depends on the domino with the highest pip count in the 
set.  Set size is calculated by applying 
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(1) 
   
where n represents the highest pip count in a set of dominoes + 1 (i.e., for double-6 
dominoes, n = 7).  One is added to the highest pip count to account for the zero (or blank) 
dominoes.  By applying Equation 1, double-6 dominoes contain 28 dominoes while 
double-3 dominoes contain 10 dominoes.  Now that the set size is calculated, Equation 2 
illustrates the number of possible starting states for two player dominos with set size L 
and a boneyard size B. 
 
 
(2) 
Where SS is the number of starting states, L is the size of the set, B is the boneyard size 
(B ≤ L-2) and D is the size of a player’s hand (both players have equal hand sizes).   
Table 1 illustrates how the number of starting states grows exponentially as the pip size 
grows. 
Table 1:  Table of Starting States for Dominoes. 
Pip Size Dominoes in set Distribution Starting States 
Double-2 6 2-2-2 20 
Double-3 10 3-3-4 4,200 
Double-4 15 5-5-5 576,576 
Double-5 21 7-7-7 271,591,320 
Double-6 28 9-9-10 6.38 × 1011 
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While strategies in many board games involve computing a set of plays based on a single 
board state, 638 billion starting states make it very difficult to compute the perfect play 
for any starting state at the beginning of a game. 
Uncertainty. 
Dominoes is also a partially observable game with probability.  This adds the 
element of uncertainty to the complexity of the game by introducing chance nodes and 
information sets.  A chance node is a position on the game tree in which probability is 
associated with the action taken.  For dominoes, chance nodes arise when a player pulls 
from the boneyard.  Information sets are positions on the game tree in which the agent 
has no knowledge of its position on the tree.  Figure 2 illustrates a partially observable 
game instance (constructed in Gambit software [21]) of double-2 dominoes where there 
are two player agents, the player (red) and opponent (blue).  There is also a chance agent 
(green) that represents the probabilistic property of drawing dominoes from the boneyard.   
The player agent can observe its own two dominoes that are (1|1) (where (1|1) 
represents the one-one domino) and (1|0); however, it cannot see the target agent’s two 
dominoes or the other two dominoes in the boneyard.  From the player’s perspective, the 
target and boneyard share a uniform distribution of the dominoes (2|2), (2|0), (2|1) and 
(0|0) with each entity having 2 unknown dominoes [21].   
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Figure 2:  Partially observable game with probability (created with Gambit game theory software [21]). 
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Information sets (labeled by dashed lines) indicate a set of nodes in which players 
cannot be sure to which node they belong.  For dominoes, information sets represent 
instances when players cannot differentiate the opponent’s current state or future action.   
Because of this uncertainty, a decision engine must evaluate all possible outcomes and 
payouts to calculate an accurate expected value of the game from every member of the 
information set.  This means that the engine must account for every possible combination 
of dominoes between the target and the boneyard.  This adds more computational 
complexity to solving the game.  Applying this logic, the game instance in Figure 1 must 
compute the current complex problem (branching factor of 6) along with every other 
possible start state (or �199 � = 92,378  starting states, including each state’s branching 
factors) of the opponent, assuming the player hand stays the same.   
Simplifying the Game 
In order to solve a game of dominoes for this research, the game must be 
simplified.  One way to simplify the game of dominoes is to use subsets of the total set of 
dominoes, where the total set of dominoes is 28 dominoes ranging from (0|0) to (6|6).  A 
subset of dominoes ranges from (0|0) to a smaller value domino such as (2|2) with six 
dominoes or (3|3) that contains 10 dominoes.  This is depicted in Table 1. 
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Scope 
The scope of this research involves producing an algorithm that has the ability to 
make predictions of the opponent’s strategy as well as producing an optimal move for a 
player agent.   
Limitations  
Experimentation for this research employs double-3 dominoes.  A set of double-3 
dominoes contains enough dominoes to evaluate two player dominoes games with 
partially observable information and chance nodes.  For this research, the starting state of 
all games includes two players’ hands of three dominoes with a boneyard size of four.  
This subset of dominoes is chosen because it is the smallest subset of dominoes that still 
provides enough dominoes to have a boneyard size slightly larger than one player’s hand 
size (that is similar to play in a full set).  For instance the starting state of double-6 
dominoes consists of nine dominoes in both players’ hands with a boneyard size of 10 
dominoes.  In addition, larger boneyard sizes create larger branching factors at chance 
nodes. 
Additionally, all games end after the first round.  In other words, after the first 
domino hand is played, the participant with the highest score wins.  Playing only one 
round is different than establishing a predefined score and playing many rounds until that 
score is achieved. Since these limitations do not affect the basic rules of the game or how 
it is played, more computations can be applied to solve this problem. 
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Assumptions 
Research is conducted under the assumption that there is no bluffing involved in 
dominoes.  Bluffing in dominoes entails a player implying he or she lacks an available 
play by pulling from the boneyard even if he or she has and existing play.  All domino 
rules applied in this research come from Domino Basics and Domino [2, 12]. It is 
assumed that all domino rules followed from this reference apply to real world domino 
games. 
Contributions 
 
This research project contributes in the areas of game theory and opponent 
modeling.  The research presents empirical evidence showing that, for three different 
strategy opponents, there is potential and actual value gained over a game theoretic player 
by exploiting an opponent’s actions.  Furthermore, this research confirms the actual value 
computed by employing an MDA classifier predicting three different playing styles in the 
game of dominoes.   
Methodology 
 
To complete this research, a simple dominoes agent is developed to play games 
according to the rules of dominoes.  The agent is required to facilitate every start state of 
double-3 dominoes between a player agent and three different opponent types.  The 
player agent uses an opponent modeling algorithm to predict the type of the opponent.  
The player agent plays incorporating opponent’s type into a backwards induction 
algorithm [25] to maximize score.   
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Results show the expected and actual value gained by the opponent model as well 
as how well it predicts the opponent type.  The expected value gain of the opponent 
model is a calculation of the highest gain in value (over a Nash equilibrium player) that 
an opponent model can provide against a specific opponent strategy.  This gain is 
computed by recording the value of applying an oracle (opponent model with 100% 
prediction accuracy) to the player subtracting a value computed applying Nash 
equilibrium decisions with no oracle.  The actual value gain is the gain in value over the 
Nash equilibrium player while applying an opponent classifier in place of the oracle.  The 
prediction accuracy of the opponent classifier is calculated by taking a ratio of the 
number of correctly predicted targets over the number of attempts to predict a specific 
target. 
Results 
 
Empirical results show that there is a potential value gain over a Nash equilibrium 
player in score for fully and partially observable environments for specific strategy types.  
The actual value gained is positive for a fully observable environment for score and total 
wins and ties.  Actual value gained over the Nash equilibrium player from the opponent 
model only exist for score, while the opponent modeler demonstrates a higher potential to 
win and/or tie in comparison to a pure game theoretic agent. 
Thesis Overview 
 
Chapter II of this thesis discusses previous work in the field of game theory and 
opponent modeling as well as definitions of many of the concepts discussed in this thesis.  
Chapter III illustrates how the algorithm is created and implemented, while Chapter IV 
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discusses and analyses the results of the implementation and testing.  Finally, Chapter V 
concludes this thesis and discusses future work. 
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II. Literature Review 
In Game theory there are many ways to overcome an opponent.  The following 
sections acknowledge concepts from previous work in the areas of game theoretic tree 
search and opponent modeling.  This chapter also provides details of the advantages and 
limitations to game tree search.  Furthermore, this chapter illustrates the benefits of 
opponent modeling in partially observable strategy games.  
Fully Observable Games 
 
Chess is a game of perfect knowledge.  Games with perfect knowledge are called 
fully observable games [26].  Deep Blue applies game tree search in chess.  In doing so, 
this system was able to defeat chess world champion Garry Kasperov[5, 26].  The Deep 
Blue agent models a chess board and makes predictions based on outcomes (in most 
cases) 14 game tree layers in advance.  Fully observable board games like checkers, chess 
and go are constantly researched in efforts to find more efficient winning strategies.     
With perfect knowledge, programming an agent can be as simple as implementing 
a game tree and performing a search to find the optimal move for each turn; however, 
problems (such as increased search times and stack overflows) commence as the game 
complexity increases.  Additional issues arise when choosing the best evaluation 
function, which is simply the algorithm which returns the best prediction of the value of 
the game at a specific node.  MiniMax is a search algorithm that invokes on an evaluation 
function and “serves as the basis for mathematical analysis of games” [26]. 
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MiniMax Search 
When working with a complex search tree to find the optimal move to make at 
every level of the tree, a wise decision is to limit the counter move that the opponent is 
capable of making for that turn.  This is done by choosing the move that maximizes the 
player’s chance of winning, while minimizing the opponent’s winning chances.  
According to Funge and Millington [14], it can be easy to predict chances of 
winning towards the end of the game based on the minimal count of plays remaining.  
Conversely, counting remaining plays can be more difficult in the beginning and middle 
of the game, because of the uncertainty of where the game ends.  Therefore, an evaluation 
function is employed to predict how the end game states appear [14].  This function can 
also be called a heuristic function on a game tree search. 
For this search to work, the player and the opponent or adversary are labeled the 
terms “MAX” and “MIN,” respectively.  Furthermore, as explained above, each level of 
the game tree represents one of these participants.  
Figure 3 illustrates how the evaluation function depicts values at every node in the 
tree in terms of MAX and decides the most advantageous move to make.  This algorithm 
is assessing every move possibility in the game tree with an evaluation function to predict 
the ending score in the leaf nodes.  The algorithm then cycles this final score up through 
the nodes to the two possible moves that MAX can take.  The node with the highest score 
MIN will allow is chosen [17]. 
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Figure 3:  MiniMax game tree. 
 
As shown in Figure 3 MAX chooses the right node at a value of 2.  This 
assessment is completed at every turn throughout the game until a terminal (win, loss or 
tie) state is achieved.  
The Expectimax (EM) algorithm [26] is applied to MiniMax to account for 
probability (chance nodes) within the game tree.  Equation 3 illustrates the value 
calculated at a chance node within a tree with probabilistic nodes [16].  This equation 
states 
 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑠) = �𝑃(𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖) ×
𝑛
𝑖
𝑈(𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖) (3) 
 
where P(childi) is the probability of a specific child node of s and U(childi) is the utility 
value of childi and n is the number of chance options (for this research, dominoes in the 
boneyard).   
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Stochastic Partially Observable Games 
A game is said to be partially observable and stochastic if there is any random and 
hidden information.  Examples of this type of game are card games such as Poker and 
Bridge where players are dealt random hands hidden to their opponents [26].  
Furthermore, as stated in the last chapter, the game of dominoes also shares this trait.   
Partially observable stochastic games take on many forms and fashions.  Card 
games like Poker and Bridge are partially observable because participants are unaware of 
their opponent’s cards.  This concept also holds true for games like dominoes.  The 
stochastic element is encompassed in random card distribution [26] as well as pulls from 
the boneyard.  Non-stochastic elements of dominoes such as a fixed opponent strategy 
can be modeled by applying opponent modeling techniques. 
Game theory and Opponent Modeling 
 
Game theory can be augmented by modeling an opponent’s future actions and/or 
current state.  Ross’s [25] definition of game theory outlines how it is applied to various 
applications:  
Game theory is the study of the ways in which strategic interactions among 
economic agents produce outcomes with respect to the preferences (or utilities) of 
those agents, where the outcomes in question might have been intended by none 
of the agents [25]. 
 
This means that when two agents interact with one another, even though each agent has a 
desired outcome, the outcome of that interaction could be in the favor of one, all or none 
of the agents involved.  Modeling an opponent allows the player to better decide which 
action it needs to take to receive the best possible utility (or quantified outcome) in a 
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game situation.  The first part of this section discusses the M* search algorithm that aids 
a game theoretic approach by providing an opponent model to adversary search 
(MiniMax).  The second part discusses research in applying opponent modeling to poker.  
Later discussed is how neural networks are employed to learn an approximation of the 
opponent model that has lower memory requirements than the full opponent model in 
order to simplify the opponent space and expand the amount of opponents that can be 
modeled.  Lastly is a discussion of how to rank opponent models in order to choose an 
optimal model.   
M* Search. 
This section discusses Carmel and Markovitch’s M* search algorithm [6].  The 
goal of this search algorithm is to take advantage of the opponent’s weaknesses 
(tendencies to make plays other than game theoretic equilibrium moves) throughout the 
game.  To accomplish this, M* applies an opponent model to the MiniMax algorithm.  
Results from running this algorithm demonstrate a higher winning percentage in fully 
observable extensive form games.  
The M* search algorithm employs an opponent model in order to exploit the 
opponent’s weaknesses through adversarial search [6].  Assuming an accurate opponent 
model, the information obtained provides to the player an advantage of playing a best 
response to the opponent’s modeled strategy instead of the best response to a presumed 
Nash Equilibrium opponent.  This situational awareness offers the player more 
opportunities to win games that are otherwise unwinnable in equilibrium play.  M* works 
by identifying instances in the game where an opponent underestimates the potential of a 
 
 
17 
 
certain action and chooses a move with less value, or times when the opponent 
overestimates the potential of a move and takes a detrimental action.  These occurrences 
are called swindle and trap positions respectively. 
The M* algorithm works similar to MiniMax by employing an evaluation 
function and search depth to maximize what a player can achieve in a certain play; 
however, the difference is that M* incorporates an opponent model to provide the 
specific action of the opponent.  This provides the algorithm information on how the 
opponent may differ from the Nash Equilibrium opponent.  The following definition by 
Carmel and Markovitch, further explains how this opponent model is applied to the 
algorithm. 
1. Given an evaluation function f, P = (f, NIL) is a player [6] (with a modeling-level 
0, or search depth of zero). 
2. Given an evaluation function f and a player O (with modeling level n - 1), P = (f, 
O) is a player (with a modeling level n). 
The modeling level of the opponent corresponds to the level in which the player 
models the opponent.  For example, a player with a modeling level of zero does not 
model its opponent.  The modeling level of 1 models an opponent with a modeling level 
of zero and so on [6]. 
The player P from this definition is used as the opponent model.  Using P in the 
equation, the input of M* becomes <position, depth, (fpl, P)>, where fpl is the player’s 
evaluation function and P is the opponent model [6].  The output of M* is either a value, 
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a state or both depending on the preference of the software designer.  Figure 4 illustrates 
the algorithm [6]. 
 
Figure 4:  M* Algorithm [6]. 
Figure 5 shows an example game tree that illustrates the recursive calls by the M* 
algorithm [6].   
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Figure 5: Game tree recursive search of M* with M*(a,3,f2(f1,f0)) [6]. 
 
 
The example in Figure 5 illustrates how the player “swindles” the opponent by 
convincing the opponent that the player will select leaf node-o; however, the player 
actually chooses node-n.  This occurs as a result of the opponent’s model of the player 
presuming the player is using the f0 evaluation function.  Since this is the case, the 
opponent’s model propagates a value of -6 to node-b and a 0 to node-c.  Nonetheless, the 
player is really using the f2 evaluation function that returns a value of 10 from node-n.  
This value is strong enough to propagate back to the root (through backward induction) 
and become the max value for the player.  This value is also the highest value of all f2 leaf 
node evaluations.  One thing to note here is that a standard MiniMax evaluation of this 
game using the f2 evaluation function yields 7.  Therefore, this evaluation demonstrates 
that M* potentially results in higher scores than MiniMax. 
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Carmel and Markovitch’s results from this study show that M* is more effective 
than a Nash Equilibrium agent at winning at checkers extensive form games.  Their tests 
result in a higher number of wins and higher scores achieved in total against opponents in 
the fully observable games of tic-tac-toe and checkers. 
The M* algorithm is an interesting culmination of logic in that it not only 
attempts to acquire the best value for the player, but it also works to exploit the weakness 
of the opponent.  M* shares many concepts of MiniMax; however, it differs from 
MiniMax by employing an opponent model, that predicts moves based on the opponent’s 
strategy.  This type of logic can be used to expose higher scoring games and/or wins that 
Nash Equilibrium does not allow; however, this opponent modeling research example 
only accounts for fully observable games.  The next two sections provide examples of 
opponent modeling use for partially observable games. 
Opponent Modeling in Poker.  
When researching opponent modeling for partially observable games, Poker is 
one of the most popular games researched.  This section describes two agents that model 
opponents in the area of opponent modeling in poker.  The first is an agent called Loki [3, 
11].  This agent applies weights to possible opponent states (or hands) based on the 
opponent’s actions on previous rounds.  The second agent called Poki [10], builds on 
Loki by predicting potential actions the opponent will select.  Both methods are shown to 
be effective against opponents in open forums and closed environments.  
Loki is an approach to opponent modeling in poker that is “capable of observing 
its opponents, constructing opponent models and dynamically adapts its play to best 
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exploit patterns in the opponent’s play” [3].  This agent applies a probability distribution 
to the opponent’s potential cards by assigning and updating weights to those possibilities 
as the opponent bets, raises or calls.  Statistics are then reevaluated every time the 
opponent takes an action updating the opponent model. 
Table 2 illustrates a subset of every possible opponent hand in a hand of Texas 
Hold’em [3]. 
Table 2:  Re-Weighting of Various Hands after the Flop [3]. 
Hand Weight HR HS ~PP EHS Rwt Nwt Comments 
JH, 
4H 0.01 0.993 0.99 0.04 0.99 1 0.01 very strong, not likely 
AC, JC 1 0.956 0.931 0.09 0.94 1 1 strong, very likely 
5H, 
2H 0.6 0.004 0.001 0.35 0.91 1 0.2 weak, good potential 
6S, 5S 0.7 0.026 0.006 0.21 0.76 0.9 0.54 moderate, low potential 
5S, 3S 0.4 0.816 0.736 0.04 0.74 0.85 0.6 mediocre, moderate potential 
 
were, the numbers in the first column represent the number on a playing card and the 
capital letters represent the first letter in each suit (i.e, S is for Spades, H is for hearts).  
The purpose of the table is to show how each hand is re-weighted after the flop.  For each 
possible hand the opponent modeler’s algorithm calculates the initial weight (Weight), 
un-weighted hand rank (HR), hand strength (HS), and other factors leading to a new 
overall weight (Nwt) [3].  To explain how this table works, Billings gives details on QS-
TS.  He states that though this is a strong hand at first, when accompanied with a flop of 
3H-4H-JH, the hand strength is then calculated low at 0.189 (where 1 is high and 0 is 
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low).  This is because there are other potential hands available that can better maximize 
on this flop.  After further calculations the algorithm yields an effective hand strength 
(EHS) of 0.22 for this hand.  Consequently, per statistical observations of the opponent, 
this is lower than the hand strength they usually bet on.  The potential hand is then 
assigned a new weight of 0.01.  Furthermore, the new overall weight along with the 
opponent’s next action is the key predictor of whether the opponent has that hand or not.   
When played 100,000 games against controlled setup models, Loki was ahead by 
approximately $5,000 while the other models were down $550.  Loki also does well in 
online poker play against humans; however, not enough information is present to show 
that it can outperform previous best programs [3].   
Poki is an AI poker agent that also plays on an online poker server with human 
players.  It is used to store game data for poker research [11].  This application is a 
successor to Loki.   
One improvement made in this application simplifies the opponent modeling 
process by eliminating the re-weighting table and an artificial neural network (ANN).  By 
eliminating the re-weighting approach, this framework alleviates the burden of 
accounting for a number of active opponents and betting positions.  This reduces the 
systems labor factor [11].  Furthermore, the Poki models specific opponents which allow 
it to make more informed decisions. 
An ANN is a machine learning algorithm that loosely represents a biological 
neural structure, or brain [11].  Davidson also states that neural networks “typically 
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provide reasonable accuracy, especially in noisy domains.  However they rarely can 
produce better results than a more formal system built with specific domain knowledge.” 
Figure 6 employs the inputs from Table 3 [10].  The ANN in Poki is trained by 
applying back-propagation [10] (or supervised learning process for ANNs).   
 
Figure 6:  A neural network predicting on opponent’s future action [10]. 
The figure illustrates how the neural network makes use of the 17 inputs in 
Table 3 and makes a decision on whether an opponent will Fold, Check/Call or Bet/Raise 
[10]. 
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Table 3:  Neural Network Inputs [10]. 
# Type Description 
0 real Immediate pot odds 
1 real bet ratio 
2 bool Committed 
3 bool one bet to call 
4 bool two or more bets to call 
5 bool betting round = turn 
6 bool betting round = river 
7 bool last bets called by player > 0 
8 bool players's last action ws a bet or raise 
9 real 0.1 X num Players 
10 bool active players is 2 
11 bool player is first to act 
12 bool player is last to act 
13 real estimated hand strength for opponent 
14 real estimated potential strength for opponent  
15 bool expert predictor says they would call 
16 bool expert predictor says they would raise 
17 bool Poki is in the hand 
 
Poki was able to routinely predict opponent actions with an 80% accuracy, while 
sometimes achieving accuracies of 90% [11].  While Poki makes a significant 
improvement to state only predictions, it requires a significant amount of data to function 
properly against a diverse set of opponents [20].  The next section describes how 
opponent models can be generalized creating a more robust agent. 
Generalizing Opponents to Simplify the Opponent Space. 
This section describes how opponent modeling can be generalized to use in game 
theoretic solutions of a partially observable extensive form game.  The partially 
observable extensive form game covered in this section is called Guess It [19, 20].  
Because of hidden game state information in partially observable games, game theoretic 
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solutions such as MiniMax become difficult or non-useful to apply.  To make this 
information visible, predictions must be made using techniques such as opponent 
modeling.  “Opponent models are necessary in games where the game state is only 
partially known to the player” [20].  At the same time, many opponent models are used to 
train against specific opponents deeming it time consuming to train an agent against 
multiple different opponents.  Locket, et al solve this problem by generalizing opponent 
types in Guess It allowing for an opponent model to play against many different 
opponents without training against opponent-specific models [20].   
Guess It is a game where each player is dealt an equal number of cards (usually 
6), and one card is faced down on the table for players to guess.  Participants cannot see 
each other’s cards making this a partially observable game.  The goal is for participants to 
figure out the identity of the card faced down by taking turns obtaining and giving 
information about each other’s hand.  In each turn, players have three possible actions.  
The first is to identify the faced down card.  The second possible action is to “ask” the 
opponent for a card that player does not have.  Players can also “bluff” by asking for 
cards that they already have.  The participant who identifies the hidden card wins, while 
any false identification of the hidden card is an automatic loss.  
Game theoretic solutions such as MiniMax and other variants of MiniMax make it 
simple to find the best move in many extensive form games; however, hidden 
information in Guess It complicates play because the game state is not as obvious.  Other 
game theoretic solutions include partially observable Markov decision processes 
(POMDP’s) though, for games with more than just a few states, POMDP solutions 
 
 
26 
 
become intractable [24].   This makes opponent modeling a great resource for solving 
games with hidden information. 
Opponent modeling inputs an opponent’s previous actions to a learning engine to 
help predict the opponent’s state or next action.  In many cases opponent models learn 
through machine learning tools such as classification algorithms or neural networks.  
These tools are used to predict opponent characteristics by using game state features as 
inputs.  Opponent characteristics are associated to classes identified by features entered 
into the tool.  Each model is opponent-specific, meaning that for each opponent, a new 
model must be developed.  This becomes a time management challenge for training for 
several opponents. 
Lockett solves the specific opponent problem by generalizing opponents in the 
game of “Guess It” and employing mixture models.  A mixture model in this research is a 
probability distribution over a “cardinal set” of opponents [20].  In this research, the 
cardinal set contains four different opponent-type categories.  Each one of these types has 
high potential to defeat another specific type as long as that type is identified.  A mixture 
model identifier employs neural networks to predict player-types through a supervised 
learning process.  From here, the agent can make a decision based on which opponent it 
is playing.  Experimentation was conducted using a mixture model based player and a 
controlled setup player. 
The four opponent-type categories of the cardinal set consist of Always-Ask, 
Always-Bluff, Call-then-Ask and Call-then-Bluff.  Always-Ask never calls or bluffs, 
while Always-Bluff never asks or calls.  The Call-then-Ask agent attempts to name the 
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center card if the other player asks for a card the Call-then-Ask agent lacks, otherwise it 
asks, while Call-then-Bluff calls every potential bluff; otherwise it bluffs [20].  
In the cardinal set, each player-type has an effective counter measure for another 
specific player type.  For example Table 4 illustrates all the hierarchy of all strategies.  
Each strategy is able to defeat one of the other strategies.   
Table 4: Guess It Strategy Hierarchy Matrix [20]. 
Strategy Defeats 
Always-Bluff Call-Then-Bluff 
Call-Then-Bluff Call-Then-Ask 
Call-Then-Ask Always-Ask 
Always-Ask Always-Bluff 
 
As long as the agent correctly models which opponent-type it is playing, it can 
determine which strategy to use against it. This serves as the basis of generalizing player 
types. 
Figure 7 illustrates the block diagram of mixture based architecture developed by 
Locket, et al. [20].  The model includes two modules of integration.  The mixture 
identification module accepts the game state as an input and identifies a mixture.  The 
mixture in this diagram is a probability distribution over all possible opponents in the 
cardinal set.  The decision module accepts the mixture as well as a board state and makes 
a decision on whether to bluff or call.  The default move is to ask [20].   
The controlled setup player in this experiment employs only the decision module.  
While there is the absence of the mixture identification module, the controlled setup has 
an identical training and validation regimen.  The absence of a mixture identification 
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module in the controlled setup allows for testing the performance of the mixture 
identification module of the mixture based player. 
 
Figure 7:  Mixture-Based Architecture for Opponent Modeling in Guess It [20]. 
 
By generalizing opponent-types in a mixture model, the agent was able to win an 
average of 71.3% of 220,000 games played against 11 diverse opponents, while the 
controlled setup won an average of 57.7% [20].  This diverse set of opponents included 
the cardinal set opponents as well as unknown opponent types.  When playing against all 
unknown player types, the mixture model based player won an average of 61.5% games, 
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while the controlled setup player won an average of 54.6% of its games.  In addition, 
when played 20,000 games against the control player, the mixture model won an average 
of 77.6% of the games.  Lockett, et al. also state that all results are statistically significant 
with to p < 0.05 [20].  This shows that generalizing an opponent has the ability to apply 
opponent modeling on a broader scale without training against every different opponent.   
Environment Value.  
The discussion in this chapter involves many different methods of opponent 
modeling.  The question to ask is which type is the best to use for an agent in a specific 
environment.  This section bridges the gap into which model will be optimal to use 
compared with other opponent model types. 
Opponent modeling has the potential to improve a player’s expected score or 
winning potential in a game depending on the environment in which the game takes place 
[4].  This value of a game is improved by utilizing two classes of agent models.  The first 
model type is the opponent’s state in the game and the second model is of the opponent’s 
actions.  Given an accurate model of both of these features improves the value of the 
game to the player’s favor.  The environment value of an opponent model is the game 
theoretic value improvement that a particular opponent model will provide an agent given 
the environment.  This environment value indicates an “upper bound to the potential 
performance improvement of an agent” [4]. This section explains how these features (if 
accurately modeled) help to improve the game theoretic value of a game. 
Borghetti states that an agent model is a function or method that “predicts 
something” about another agent [4].  As stated above, agent models can be employed to 
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predict information such as the state and/or the action of another agent or opponent.  This 
information is then used to select optimal moves.  Optimal moves are selected using 
game theoretic algorithms such as MiniMax or the probabilistic variant Expectimax (EM) 
[26].  
The state of a game involves all information about the game at a particular 
instance in time.  In computer science parlance, the state of a game can be compared to a 
node on a tree.  The class of state opponent models provides a probability distribution 
over all possible states [4].  For example, for any number of possible states that an 
opponent can belong to, the probabilities of all states must sum to one. 
This logic is also true for the class of opponent models that predict the actions of 
an opponent.   Actions are classified as the strategy or move that the opponent (or any 
participant in the game) will make at a given state in the game.  As explained in the 
previous paragraph, this model class provides a probability distribution over all actions. 
The environment value (V_Lambda) is the maximum improvement of the game 
theoretic value given a certain environment.  This value is the difference between an 
environment using a perfect model and environment using no model at all.  Equation 4 
[4] illustrates this explanation. 
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(4)  
Where: 
Γ – The original game with no opponent model 
Γ′ – The transformed game with a perfect opponent model 
𝑈(M) – The utility gained in a game 
𝑀 – A particular model that provides a probability distribution over actions or states  
Borghetti states that given an environment, an upper bound can be developed for 
an environment to use as a baseline for any opponent model (in its class) to follow [4].  
This upper bound baseline is developed by employing a perfect information agent model 
or oracle to provide an optimal state or action set.  The oracle is employed to display the 
maximum potential that an opponent model can deliver.  Assuming MiniMax (or similar 
algorithm) is employed and all play is rational, if a model cannot do any better, the 
resulting value is the Nash Equilibrium. 
The precondition to finding the environment value is that the Nash Equilibrium of 
a game can be found.  For this research, this requires solving the game of dominoes, 
which is not possible with today’s computers.  “When this precondition does not hold, we 
may be better off approximating the environment value using an estimation of the 
distribution over likely opponents.” [4].  This research focuses on finding the expected 
potential value gained from the information an action opponent model can provide 
against specific opponents.  Therefore the environment value is not calculated. 
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Game theory has many applications that benefit from opponent modeling today.  
The goal of applying opponent modeling is to provide information on the current state or 
future actions of the opponent.  Carmel and Markovitch’s [6] M* search provides a lot of 
insight on opponent actions to show where to capitalize on opponent mistakes in a fully 
observable environment.  If there is a way to employ M* to a partially observable 
environment, this opponent modeling algorithm could add value to dominoes.   Billings 
and Davidson, et al. [3, 11] have made vast improvements to how poker is played online 
by applying models to predict opponent states and actions; however, this research 
requires a lot of data processing to be optimal.  Locket [20] solves this problem by 
generalizing opponents into a cardinal set (or two-dimensional space of opponents 
defined by the probability of calling or bluffing [20]), in which each decision is made by 
applying the action of the generalized model.  If opponents in dominoes can be 
generalized, applying opponent modeling to dominoes should be a quicker and less data 
intensive practice.  Lastly, Borghetti shows how to choose the best opponent model for 
specific environments.  Any opponent modeler applied in current two player dominoes 
research should apply Borghetti’s technique as a baseline.   
Other Methods. 
Donkers’s [13] probabilistic opponent model search or PrOM search involves 
computing a probability distribution over several opponent types in order to make a 
decision.  PrOM search applies an approximation over several strategies, whereas this 
research will apply the exact strategy of the opponent. 
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Cowling [9] creates an ensemble method for determination of Monte Carlo Tree 
Search (MCTS).  Cowling’s research involves applying MCTS and upper bounds on 
Trees (UCT) to solve probabilistic games with hidden information.  The research applies 
these methods to the game of Magic: The Gathering in order to study many different 
heuristics that can solve this complex game.  While dominoes has probability and hidden 
information, the focus of this research is not to develop heuristics to solve dominoes as 
the simplified version of the game allows for a search to the leaf nodes of the game.  The 
main focus of opponent modeling for this research is to predict target’s strategy and 
attempt to find an optimal move on a shallow game. 
Dominoes AI Agents. 
Although there are many online dominoes games available, academic research has 
been completed in creating dominoes graphical user interfaces in C++, Java and BASIC.  
Versions have been found that employ each language respectively.  The C++ version is a 
single game GUI entitled Domino 1.2.0 [23].  This version is created by using the Qt 
Creator Library.   The Java version Badomino [18] is also a single game domino 
interface.  Smiths [28] BASIC version is a game that employs strategy tables and learning 
techniques to make optimal moves. 
Domino 1.2.0 provides a user interface that plays a single hand of double-6 
dominoes while keeping score.  It also tells the user who wins the game at the end.  While 
the project is completed in a familiar language and library there are some limitations.  
The first limitation is that most of the code and comments are in Russian.  While the code 
provides a useable GUI, the code is difficult to decipher.  There is also no way to scale 
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the code from double-6 to a smaller (or larger) set of dominoes for experimentation 
purposes.  Lastly, there is no experimental control to run many games in sequence. 
The main focus on the Badomino project is to build a well working domino 
graphical user interface employing AI logic; however, more emphasis is placed on the 
goodness of the GUI itself.  The AI module employs myopic strategies; however, it does 
apply AI to determine the best myopic strategy to employ.  Furthermore, this is also a 
single game system that is not scalable for smaller or larger sets of dominoes.   
Smiths learning algorithm involves strategy learning.  This technique applies a 
model that plays hundreds of games against itself to learn many situations of the game in 
order to make an optimal move against other opponents.  Smith’s research applies 
strategy tables to avoid applying techniques used for fully observable games.  This 
research applies opponent modeling and roll-out techniques to overcome many of the 
barriers involved with partially observable games. 
Conclusion 
Game theory is a complex field in which research is conducted implementing 
search trees and other graphical figures to play games at an optimal level.  When 
traversing a tree in adversarial games, MiniMax search implements an evaluation 
function that estimates the value of the game at that point in order to optimize every 
action.  The drawback of this search is that its purpose is to work in a fully observable 
environment.  Opponent modeling is used in many in many applications in order to 
produce a better estimate on imperfect information to make the best prediction.  The next 
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section explains how opponent modeling will be used in two-player dominoes to make 
the best prediction in a stochastic partially observable environment. 
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III.  Methodology 
Introduction 
This chapter describes the methodology of how a dominoes artificial intelligence 
agent employs opponent modeling to achieve improved knowledge of the opponent 
strategy in order to optimize the decision making process.  The chapter starts with the 
definition of the problem.  Next, the experimental setup is explained.  Lastly, this chapter 
explains how each agent of the experimental setup is tested. 
Problem Definition 
 
Goals and Hypothesis.  
The goal of this research project is to show how well modeling an opponent’s 
strategy can improve a player’s decision in two player dominoes.  When an opponent’s 
strategy is unknown (assuming all players are rational), the optimal strategy is to achieve 
a Nash equilibrium through an adversarial search.  MiniMax (a type of adversarial 
search) can be applied to this research by creating a game tree representation for the 
game of dominoes.  Figure 8 illustrates a simple game of dominoes where the player and 
opponent both pull three random dominoes from a full set of double-6 dominoes.  Each 
board picture represents a node on a game tree.  The position on the game tree is called 
the game (or board) state.  This tree represents all possibilities of playing this game 
instance between the two players.   
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Figure 8:  Game tree representation of dominoes. 
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If the opponent plays with a non-rational strategy, another equilibrium can be 
achieved that capitalizes on non-rational actions made by the opponent.  This is achieved 
by applying M* search [6], which replaces MIN’s strategy with an opponent model.  In 
order to use M* search, an opponent model (or strategy) must be identified.  This concept 
generates the research question “how does M* search perform in the game of dominoes?” 
In addition to finding and evaluating the opponent model, another challenge arises 
in applying M* search to a partially observable game.  The issue with applying a search 
algorithm to a partially observable game is that the level of certainty in the location on a 
game tree is much worse than in a fully observable environment.  Without accurate board 
state data, potential exists for the search method to traverse a game tree with an erroneous 
game instance, reducing the possibility of finding an optimal play. 
Approach. 
To solve these problems, this project centers around a hierarchal approach that 
focuses on employing an opponent classifier to predict opponent types [27].  Then a 
decision engine for the player agent uses the estimated opponent’s strategy in M* search.  
To handle the effects of hidden information, Monte Carlo sampling simulates iterations 
through multiple possible game states according to the actual probability distributions of 
unknown dominos in the boneyard and the opponent’s hand. 
The hierarchal approach to this decision system involves first predicting an 
opponent type, then applying the opponent’s strategy to M* search.  Opponent types from 
here on will be defined as “targets.”  There are three targets identified for this research.    
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Each target applies a different strategy to play the game.  The first target is the 
random-play agent, which makes legal plays of pseudo-randomly selected dominoes at its 
turns.  The second target agent is the myopic scoring target, which tries to score the most 
points at each play without considering consequences on future plays.  The final target 
plays myopically defensive by blocking the player from taking an action when there is an 
opportunity.  The myopic defense target agent also keeps the board at a low scoring level 
to deny the player from achieving high scores during turns. 
The random target agent plays legal moves in a pseudo-random fashion.  This 
target selects its plays from a list of legal moves; however the move is selected at 
random, with equal likelihood for any legal move.  The seed for this random number 
generator can either be generated based on the system clock for individual games or a 
game iteration number for experimentally controlled games during repeated testing.   
The myopic scoring target agent is a greedy scorer that selects a legal move that 
scores the highest from all legal moves with no concern for the future value of the move 
later in the game.  If a tie arises between possible moves or there is no score available at 
that play, the myopic scoring player plays domino that produces the highest board count 
to increase high scoring opportunities for future plays. (The board count is the sum of all 
of the outside numbers of the domino chain.) 
The myopic defense target agent’s goal is to reduce the number of plays available 
to its opponent as well as prevent an opponent from obtaining a high score.  This agent 
selects actions that limit the player’s legal plays on the next turn.  Figure 9 shows an 
example of board states from least favorable to most favorable for the defensive target.   
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Figure 9:  Play options available for the player based on target’s defensive strategy. 
 
In this example a)’s playable options (from left to right) are 2, 3 and 1 giving a 
player three options to choose from. b)’s playable options (from left to right) are 1 and 3 
allowing for two playable options, while c)’s only playable option is 3.  Limiting playable 
options restricts the opponent’s available actions, therefore creating a possible pull or 
pass instance.  Furthermore, if there are no available defensive plays or a tie in defensive 
options, the defensive target plays the domino that produces the lowest board count to 
keep all possible scores low.  
The player agent computes the M* search decision before each play.  The 
opponent model used in M* is the same strategy that one of the targets will apply.  Since 
M* is a variant of MiniMax search [6] , it maximizes the player’s decision based on 
 
 
41 
 
predicted decisions of the target.  Monte Carlo rollouts are applied to the M* search to 
iterate through many possible board state situations.  These rollouts provide the decision 
engine with an expected game state outcome in order for the player to make an optimal 
decision in an uncertain environment, given that the opponent model matches the true 
opponent. 
Testing. 
Testing this approach involves measuring the prediction accuracy of an opponent 
classifier as well as measuring how well M* search performs in the game of dominoes 
against specific player types.  The accuracy of the opponent classifier is evaluated by 
applying a confusion matrix of all target predictions.  Table 5 illustrates the data 
representation of this matrix.   
Table 5:  Confusion matrix of the opponent modeler. 
  Predicted Target 
  Random 
Myopic 
Scoring 
Myopic 
Defense 
A
ct
ua
l T
ar
ge
t Random A B C 
Myopic 
Scoring D E F 
Myopic 
Defense G H I 
 
Capital letters represent the number of predictions computed by the opponent 
classifier for a specific target.  The rows indicate the actual target type (or labels of the 
sample data) and the columns represent the predicted target type.  The letters in the 
diagonal (A, E and I) represent all accurately predicted data while all other letters 
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represent the inaccurate predictions [15].  The accuracy of the opponent classifier is 
computed by applying the table values to  
 
 
(5) 
 
where AC is the accuracy, A, E and I are the numbers of accurately predicted targets and 
Stotal is the total number of targets evaluated.  Furthermore, when applied to the opponent 
classifier, the testing prediction accuracy of the classifier is calculated by 
 
 
(6) 
 
where ACOM is the prediction accuracy of the opponent classifier, p is the number of 
correctly predicted targets and Sturns is the total number of turns predicted by the opponent 
classifier.   
To test the potential and actual performance of an opponent classifier with the M* 
search decision engine, an all-knowing oracle is introduced.  The oracle is a method that 
predicts the target’s state and future actions with perfect accuracy.  The oracle is applied 
to the M* decision engine in place of the opponent classifier to predict the opponent’s 
type.  A set of games is played and all decisions made by the M* decision engine with the 
oracle are verified to validate M*’s performance. 
totalS
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The expected value gain (EVG) of M* with an opponent type over the Nash 
equilibrium player is calculated applying  
 
 
(7) 
where T is the target and M*T is M* search with the target’s strategy, and EM is 
Expectimax.  The value gained by applying the M* search decision engine is calculated 
with both a perfect information and imperfect information environment.  The perfect 
information environment calculates the theoretic upper bound potential of the M* search 
decision engine with an opponent type.  The imperfect information environment 
calculates the actual upper bound value of the engine. 
 The actual value of the M* decision engine with an opponent model is calculated 
by applying the opponent model to the engine.  This value is a representation of how well 
the opponent model predicts the target.  Similar to the expected value gain calculations, 
the actual value gain is calculated in perfect and imperfect information environments to 
show perfect state information and real world conditions respectively. 
 Table 6 illustrates a four quadrant matrix of desired results for testing the M* 
algorithm.  Rows of the matrix represent the state information given for all games played.  
Columns represent the given target predictor.  With this configuration, quadrant one and 
two show a perfect state information environment, while quadrants three and four apply 
Monte Carlo Rollouts (MCR) to account for hidden information.  Quadrants one and 
three are EVG calculations while two and four are actual values. 
*( | ) ( | )TEVG U M T U EM T= −
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Table 6:  Quadrant chart of experimental results. 
  
Target Information 
  
Target Oracle OM 
State 
Info 
State 
Oracle 
1. 2. 
Expected Value 
Gain Actual Value 
Upper Bound  
MCR 
3. 4. 
Expected Value 
Gain Actual Value 
 Real World 
 
The perfect information environment yields the upper bound of M*’s potential for 
environment and actual values.  The target oracle predicts a target’s strategy with 100% 
accuracy.  This allows the M* engine to apply the correct target type at every play of 
every game, therefore each game reflects an optimal decision at every play with respect 
to M*’s capabilities.  Likewise, when applying perfect state information to the 
Expectimax engine, Expectimax plays optimal with respect to its capabilities.  Thus, the 
maximum gain is calculated by taking the difference in value between both engines with 
respect to score differentials or total games won/tied. 
Dominoes Experimental Setup 
 
This section describes the experimental setup that answers the question of 
whether an opponent model can improve a player’s decision in the game of two player 
dominoes – and by how much is the improvement. The setup consists of an adversarial 
search decision engine as well as three target agents.  The adversarial search decision 
engine consists of the M* and Expectimax search algorithms.  The player agent employs 
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this engine when playing against each of the three targets in the setup.  The next two 
subsections describe these methods.    
Adversarial Search Decision Engine.  
The player agent consults the adversarial search engine at every play.  This 
decision engine makes decisions through the application of M* and Expectimax.  M* is 
experimental setup for this research.  This algorithm is applied to make optimal decisions 
against a specific (non-rational) target throughout the game.  Expectimax the controlled 
setup.  This engine is applied to make game theoretic plays for a Nash equilibrium 
solution. 
Since dominoes is a partially observable game, play decisions are made by 
running the adversarial search algorithm through several Monte Carlo rollouts over 
possible partitions of the unknown states between the boneyard and the target.  These 
simulations allow the agent to make a probabilistically weighted decision based on the 
expected value of several possible game states.  Values of each player action are 
averaged over the all simulations. This results in an expected optimal action for the 
player at every play.  The decision engine then selects the action with the highest 
expected value.   
Expectimax is a probabilistic variant of the MiniMax adversarial search 
algorithm.  The added benefit to applying Expectimax to dominoes is that it accounts for 
chance nodes.  Chance nodes occur in dominoes when the player or target pulls a domino 
from the boneyard.  The Expectimax algorithm then returns the expected value at that 
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turn depending on how the game terminates at each chance pull.  Equation 8 represents 
how the expected value is determined at each chance node.  
  (8) 
 
where v represents the value for a specific pull from a set of dominoes in the boneyard, 
P(move) represents the probability of a domino from the boneyard and n represents the 
number of boneyard pulls.  The input for Expectimax algorithm is the board state.    
Figure 10 illustrates how Equation 8 is implemented within the Expectimax algorithm.  
The output from Expectimax is the play with the highest expected value at a specific 
chance node. 
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Figure 10:  Expectimax algorithm [16, 26]. 
 
To minimize computation, the dominoes Expectimax algorithm only employs 
Expectimax when there is more than one play to select.  When there is one action or 
fewer to choose from, running adversarial search will not yield a different result.   
The M* algorithm is also a variant of MiniMax (or Expectimax in games with 
probability); however, it also takes into account the adversary’s (or target’s) strategy.  For 
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the game of dominoes, the target’s chosen move is the only chosen action for every target 
play.  This differs from Expectimax because Expectimax searches through all moves of 
the target.  Figure 11 illustrates how the MIN-VALUE function runs a TARGET-
DECISION method to obtain the target’s decision.  Each TARGET_TYPE(state) method 
is defined in the section labeled “Targets” 
 
Figure 11: M* Algorithm for dominoes [6, 16, 26]. 
 
The computational benefit from only applying the target’s decision is that the search 
engine only explores branches of the target’s decisions.  This pruning method not only 
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speeds up computation but it also provides a more exact representation of the target’s 
decisions (assuming an accurate opponent model).  Figure 12 (created with Gambit game 
theory software [21]) illustrates a game instance in which Expectimax evaluates all 
possibilities applying a Nash equilibrium solution to the game instance.  Figure 13 
(created with Gambit game theory software [21]) illustrates how the M* algorithm only 
focuses on the actions that the myopic scoring target actually takes.  Applying M* to the 
same game tree reduces the tree from 18 leaf nodes to 3 leaf nodes.   The dashed ovals in 
Figure 12 represent the branches chosen in Figure 13 .  All other branches are pruned in 
this computation. 
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Figure 12: Game tree before M* pruning process. 
 
 
Figure 13: Game tree after M* pruning process. 
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The adversarial search engine is designed to provide a Nash equilibrium decision 
with Expectimax computations.  This engine is also applies M* search to choose a best 
response against specific targets as well as reduce the computational complexity of the 
game (assuming myopic targets).  In order for M* to predict the behavior of the target, 
the target decision algorithm must be established.   
Targets. 
This sub-section describes the three targets that play against the player agent.  
Each target starts with a set of legal moves to choose from (if there is a move to make).  
From here, they make the best decision based on stationary methods.  The random-play 
target agent plays a uniformly randomly chosen domino out of the legal moves that it can 
play.  The myopic scoring target plays the domino in the position that scores the highest.  
The defensive target plays the domino that hopefully minimizes the opponent’s 
opportunity to score in the future. 
The random target agent makes its choice by using a pseudorandom number 
generator.  This seed for the generator is generated at the beginning of the game.  This 
method chooses a random number between 0 and the size of the target’s (pre-generated) 
possible moves list minus 1.  It then selects from the list of dominoes, the domino that 
has an index that matches the random number chosen.   
The myopic scoring agent method evaluates every possible move and selects the 
highest scoring move.  In the case of a tie, the myopic scoring agent plays the domino 
that sets the highest board count.  Figure 14 illustrates the algorithm for the myopic 
scoring target. 
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Figure 14:  Algorithm for myopic scoring target. 
 The defensive scoring target makes plays that create a high defensive stance for 
the target.  This is completed by computing a unique defensive score or utility value for 
defense.  The play with the highest defensive score is the play that the defensive target 
makes. 
The defensive score is calculated by counting the number of available matching 
values on the outside dominoes of the board and subtracting this number from four (since 
there are at most four playable locations on the game board).  Figure 16 (lower cell) 
illustrates the algorithm for calculating this value.  This value is an integer between 0 and 
3, where 0 indicates four available positions to play on and 3 indicates only one available 
position to play on.   
Having a high defensive score inversely proportional to the number of matches on 
the board is important because higher values indicate there are fewer possible actions for 
the player.  Fewer actions for the player entail blocking potential for the defensive agent.  
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Figure 15 illustrates an example of how the defensive score is used in making a defensive 
decision. 
 
Figure 15:  Example of defensive score calculation to make a decision. 
 
In this example the target has an option of playing the (0|3) domino on the left or 
right side of the domino board.  If the domino is played on the right side there are 2 
numbers available to play on by the player.  The defensive score, in this case, is 2.  
Playing the (0|3) on the left side leaves only one option and the score calculated this 
option is 3, which is a higher score than playing on the right.  Having less numbers to 
play on lowers the probability of having a play.  Figure 16 illustrates the algorithm for 
completing this task. 
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Figure 16:  Algorithm for defensive scoring target. 
 
Each target employs its own strategy in order to test the quality of the opponent 
modeler with certain types of play.  The next section describes how the opponent modeler 
is fabricated in order to distinguish between each target agent. 
The Opponent Classifier. 
The opponent classifier employs machine learning to predict targets.  Machine 
learning tools for this research are chosen by matching classifier capabilities to the 
requirements of this research project.  The inputs and outputs are then chosen.  Algorithm 
selection is performed by selecting the best performing classifier after employing 5-fold 
cross validation across all classifiers.  Furthermore, the sample set is a compilation of 
target versus target competition (i.e., random versus random, random versus myopic 
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scorer, etc.) where data from each turn are sample rows.  The chosen classification tool is 
applied to the game engine to provide target prediction.  
The classifiers considered for this research are naïve Bayes, logistic regression, 
decision trees, support vector machines (or SVM’s) and neural networks. To obtain the 
best algorithm for this research, the following research requirements are established: 
1. Classifier must distinguish between 3 target classes 
2. Classifier must be able to handle large data sets (>10,000) 
3. Classifier must recognize interactions between features (i.e. if a correlation 
between two features distinguishes one class from another) to increase the 
potential of the feature set 
From these requirements, the matrix in Table 7 is devised to find the classifiers 
that best fit this research platform.  Information from [1, 7, 29] describe the reasoning for 
the decisions in Table 7. 
Table 7:  Opponent Modeling Classifier Requirements Matrix. 
  Output Choice - Three Targets 
Large Datasets >10,000 
samples) 
Interactions Between 
Features 
Naïve Bayes YES NO NO 
Logistic 
Regression NO YES YES 
Decision Trees YES NO (easily over-fits) YES 
Random 
Forests YES YES YES 
SVM's  NO (without kernel) YES YES 
Neural 
Network NO YES YES 
LDA NO YES YES 
MDA YES YES YES 
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Based on the requirements above, Table 7 shows that random forests and multiple 
discriminant analysis (MDA) are the best possible classifiers.  The inputs and outputs of 
the opponent modeling classifier are provided in Table 8.  
Table 8:  Classifier Inputs. 
Classifier Features 
1 Points Scored/Turn (double: 𝑥 ≥ 0.00)* 
2 Defensive Score (integer: 0 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 3)* 
3 Total Player Pulls/Turn (double: 𝑥 ≥ 0.00)* 
4 Total Scoring Plays/Turn (double: 𝑥 ≥ 0.00)* 
5 Board Count (integer: 𝑥 ≥ 0)* 
Classifier Output 
1 
Target Number (integer: 0 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 2)* 
0 – Random Target 
1 – Myopic Scoring Target 
2 – Myopic Defense Target 
*Variable x is the range of values that the classifier will accept.  
 
Inputs 1, 3 and 4 are normalized by the “Turn” number of the game.  Points 
Scored is the total point value earned by the target.  The Defensive Score is the same 
score defined by the defensive target.  Total Player Pulls is the total number of times the 
target has caused the player to pull from the boneyard up to that point in the game.  Total 
Scoring Plays is the total count of scoring plays the target has made up to that point.  The 
Board Count input is the sum of all outside domino pips.  (For example, Figure 17 
illustrates a game instance with a Board Count of 16.  This value is calculated by adding 
all outside values (clockwise for this example) 1+6+5+4 =16.)  Lastly, data is labeled in 
reference to the target class, where class numbers range in integers between 0 and 2.   
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Figure 17:  Domino board representation where the board count is 16. 
 
5-fold Cross validation is employed to select the better machine learning 
algorithm where fitness is decided by the accuracy of each classifier’s confusion matrix.  
Equation 9 illustrates the accuracy calculation per the confusion matrix in Table 5. 
 
 
(9) 
where Stotal is the size of the sample set introduced to the classifier and A, E and I are the 
samples that the classifier accurately classified. 
Each classifier is trained by playing games between each target.  This training 
technique is employed to make sure data are provided that illustrate as many different 
play situations as possible for each target.  Table 9 illustrates the order of training per 
game where each play is a sample of data.  The data set size increases as this training 
order is repeated. 
totalS
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Table 9: Classifier training order per game. 
Game Player Target 
1 Random Random 
2 Myopic Defense Random 
3 Myopic Scoring Random 
4 Random Myopic Defense 
5 Myopic Defense Myopic Defense 
6 Myopic Scoring Myopic Defense 
7 Random Myopic Scoring 
8 Myopic Defense Myopic Scoring 
9 Myopic Scoring Myopic Scoring 
 
From this data set, 80% of the data is applied to training and testing while the other 20% 
is employed for validation.  Once testing and validation is complete, the chosen classifier 
is equipped to pair with the M* algorithm and is ready for testing.  The next section 
describes the experimentation process that shows the value M* provides to double of 
dominoes for a particular target. 
Evaluation 
 
This section facilitates the experimentation processes involved to show if M* with 
an opponent modeler adds value to a player agent in the game of two player dominoes.  
Testing implements all possible starting conditions in a set of double-3 dominoes with a 
boneyard of 4 with players receiving 3 dominoes apiece.  This research provides evidence 
to whether the M* search decision process adds value to a player agent competing against 
three types of domino opponents.   
To evaluate this hypothesis, results from all competitions are tabulated and 
compared with two types of significance tests.  The first type of test called the difference 
of means significance test that evaluates the significance of the expected and actual value 
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gains.  The second test is the binary test that evaluates the number of M* wins.    The null 
hypothesis 𝐻0, of this research states that there is no significant improvement over 
Expectimax when employing M* search.  The alternate hypothesis H1, states that M* 
provides an improvement over Expectimax to the player agent’s game playing ability in 
both score differentials and total wins/ties. 
The difference of means is a one-tailed test that evaluates the mean scores of all 
score differentials between the Expectimax decision engine and M*.  The null hypothesis 
for this test is ℎ0:  𝜇2−𝜇1 ≤ 0,  stating that there is either no difference in the means or 
(for this research), there is not enough information to show that M* shows a significant 
expected gain in value over Expectimax.  The alternative hypothesis, ℎ0:  𝜇2−𝜇1 > 0 
states that M* shows significant gain over EM.   
Difference of means. 
For the difference of means the critical region is found on the Z-table.  The Z 
score is calculated by finding 𝑍𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 = 𝑧𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 × 𝜎𝜇2−𝜇1, where 𝜎𝜇2−𝜇1 is the standard 
deviation of the distribution of the difference of means and 𝑍𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 is the critical value.   
 
 𝜎𝜇2−𝜇1 =  �
𝜎22
𝑛
+
𝜎12
𝑛
 
(10) 
 
 
where n is the population size, and  𝜎12and 𝜎22 are the population variances. If 𝜇2−𝜇1 
falls within the critical region (which is every value greater than the critical value), the 
null hypothesis is rejected and employ the alternative hypothesis. 
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Binary-test. 
The binary test is a two tailed test that is applied to data with two outcomes [8].  
This test is applied to the win/tie data to statistically show that the win/tie percentages are 
not the same.  This test is conducted by comparing a Z score with critical values from a 
Z-table.  Equation 11 illustrates how to find the Z-score  [8]. 
 
 
n
pq
p
n
X
z
−
=  
(11) 
 
where p and q represent the prior probabilities that Expectimax will win according to its 
data set along with its complement respectively.  X is M*’s prior probability compared 
with EM’s prior probability of wins plus ties and n represents the size of the sample 
space. 
Illustrating the data. 
  Data is compared using two types of tables.  The first type illustrates score 
differential data.  Table 9 illustrates both decision engines against all three targets as well 
as the difference between each engine.  This difference is known as the expected value 
gain for score differentials.  The actual value gain also applies this table to show the 
difference in values between M* and Expectimax. 
 
Table 10:  Sample score differential results table for the value of the M* decision engine 
after all levels and factors of experimentation. 
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𝑻𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒆𝒕𝒔 Random Myopic Scoring 
Myopic 
Defense 
Decision 
Engine 
M* 
 (Source) Expectimax 
M*  
(Source) Expectimax 
M* 
(Source) Expectimax 
Fully 
Observable a b c d e F 
EVGscore ∆ a-b c-d e-f 
%Accuracy I% J% K% 
 
The lower case letters in Table 9 represent the average score differentials between the 
player and the target from the prospective target dataset.  The upper case letters represent 
the prediction accuracy of the opponent classifier.    The second type of table is the 
win/tie data table.  Table 11 is a representation of the wins table that is applied to tabulate 
the environment and actual values for wins data. 
Table 11:  Sample win/tie data table for the value of the M* decision engine after all 
levels and factors of experimentation. 
Targets Random Myopic Scoring 
Myopic 
Defense 
Decision 
Engine 
M* 
 (Source) Expectimax 
M*  
(Source) Expectimax 
M* 
(Source) Expectimax 
Fully 
Observable a b c d e F 
EVGwins/ties a-b c-d e-f 
%Accuracy I% J% K% 
 
The lower case letters represent the total values for the wins and ties against each target 
with each decision engine.  The upper case letters represent the prediction accuracy of the 
opponent classifier.  Each win/tie has a value of 1 and each loss has a value of 0.  All four 
Quadrants from Table 6 are explained applying the  and Table 11 structures. 
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 The number of tests to be run correspond to the number of levels and factors of 
experimentation.  Table 12 illustrates the levels and factors for comparing both decision 
engines.   
Table 12:  List of levels and factors for experimentation. 
Information 
Source (I) 
Observability 
(O) Target (T) 
Starting 
State (S) 
Decision 
Engine (E) 
Repeat 
(R)  
Oracle - Truth Full Random 
1-4200 
M* Search 
1-12 Myopic Scoring 
Opponent 
Modeler Partial 
Expectimax 
Search Myopic Defense 
 
The four quadrants of data are represented in the two left most columns.  
Equation 2 is applied to calculate the number of possible starting states below.   
 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 = � 𝑆𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒� × �
𝑆𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 − 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒
𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟 � (12) 
 
 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 = �104 � × �
6
3� = 4,200 (13) 
 
There are three target types that are played against in all 4,200 starting states by both 
decision engines.  Furthermore, each test is repeated 12 times to account for variations in 
boneyard pulls. 
Equation 14 applies Table 12 and shows of the number of tests needed to 
complete the dataset. 
 𝐼 × 𝑂 × 𝑇 × 𝑆 × 𝐸 × 𝑅 = # 𝑜𝑓 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑠 (14) 
 
where all variables are identified in Table 12.  This calculates to 
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 2 × 2 × 3 × 4200 × 2 × 12 = 1,209,600 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑠. (15) 
 
All experimentation follows the guidelines outlined in this chapter. The next 
chapter provides an in depth discussion on the results of this experimentation.  Chapter 4 
also describes which classifier is applied to the opponent model, then demonstrates how 
the M* decision engine performs against a target with respect to a Nash Equilibrium 
player agent.  Results from all four quadrants are analyzed for statistical significance to 
show whether the agent gains or loses value over the Nash equilibrium player depending 
on the information source and the environment.   
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IV.  Analysis and Results 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter explains the results gathered from evaluating the opponent modeling 
algorithm with the EM and M* decision engines.  The first series of experiments 
evaluates which classifying algorithm is the best for running the opponent modeler.  Next 
the expected value gain of the opponent modeler is evaluated.  Finally, the actual results 
between the M* and Expectimax decision engines are shown.  Results gathered are in the 
form of score differentials between the player agent and the target. 
Classifier Performance Results 
 
Evaluating each Classifier. 
 There are two classifying algorithms chosen as candidates to run the opponent 
modeler.  The classifiers are evaluated at three different sample sizes to assess how well 
they perform.   The first candidate is the MDA classifier.  Next is the random forests 
classifier.  Each classifier is tested and validated using of the 5-folds cross validation with 
8k, 50k and 130k samples of data, where 80% of the data samples are applied to training 
and testing and 20% of the data is applied to validation for each dataset.  Classification 
accuracy (AC) on the validation data from these testes are illustrated via the confusion 
matrices.  
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Table 13:  Confusion matrix validation results on 1,649 samples from the MDA Classifier 
with all three targets and 8,242 samples. 
  Predicted Target 
  Random 
Myopic 
Scoring 
Myopic 
Defense 
A
ct
ua
l T
ar
ge
t Random 226 166 151 
Myopic 
Scoring 147 279 133 
Myopic 
Defense 145 164 238 
 
Applying the results from this table to Equation 9 for Table 13, yields 𝐴𝐶 =
226+279+238
1,649
= 0.451.  The time to complete training, testing and validation is 50 ms.  
These data show that this classifier has the ability to classify three data types with over its 
prior percentage in a small amount of time.  Table 14 illustrates the performance with 
over 50k samples. 
Table 14:  Confusion matrix validation results on 10,059 samples from the MDA 
Classifier with all three targets and 50,291 samples. 
  Predicted Target 
  Random 
Myopic 
Scoring 
Myopic 
Defense 
A
ct
ua
l T
ar
ge
t Random 1135 1132 1083 
Myopic 
Scoring 769 1473 1107 
Myopic 
Defense 700 1069 1591 
 
Applying the results from this table to Equation 9 for Table 14, yields =
1135+1473+1591
10,059
= 0.417 .  The time to complete training, testing and validation is 330 ms.  
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These data show that it takes longer to classify the three data types; however, there is no 
value gained from more samples.  This is an indication of over-training the classifier with 
too much data.  Table 15 adds training data to confirm this assumption. 
Table 15:  Confusion matrix validation results on 25,945 samples from the MDA 
Classifier with all three targets and 129,724 samples. 
  Predicted Target 
  Random 
Myopic 
Scoring 
Myopic 
Defense 
A
ct
ua
l T
ar
ge
t Random 2771 2777 3038 
Myopic 
Scoring 2149 3643 2895 
Myopic 
Defense 1921 2564 4187 
 
Applying the results from this table to Equation 9 for Table 15, yields 𝐴𝐶 =
2771+3643+4187
29,945
= 0.409 .  The time to complete training, testing and validation is 800 ms.   
 These data show that training the classifier with more than 8k samples (with this 
feature set) over trains the MDA classifier.  Therefore, 8k samples is the best sample 
amount (when compared to the other two data sets) for this set of features. 
The next candidate is the random forests classifier.  This classifier undergoes the 
same amount of testing and validation to show its performance.  The following confusion 
matrix analysis illustrates this classifier’s performance. 
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Table 16:  Confusion matrix validation results on 1,319 samples from the Random 
Forests Classifier with all three targets and 8,242 samples. 
  Predicted Target 
  Random 
Myopic 
Scoring 
Myopic 
Defense 
A
ct
ua
l T
ar
ge
t Random 199 132 113 
Myopic 
Scoring 82 259 109 
Myopic 
Defense 83 110 232 
 
Applying the results from this table to Equation 9 for Table 16, yields 𝐴𝐶 =
199+259+232
1,319
= 0.5231.  These data show that the random forest classifier has a better 
classifying accuracy than the MDA classifier; however, this classifier spends more time 
training and validating.  The time to complete training, testing and validation is 35.32 s.  
Table 17 shows the performance of random forests with over 50k samples. 
Table 17:  Confusion matrix validation results on 8,047 samples from the Random 
Forests Classifier with all three targets and 50,291 samples. 
 
  Predicted Target 
  Random 
Myopic 
Scoring 
Myopic 
Defense 
A
ct
ua
l T
ar
ge
t Random 908 906 815 
Myopic 
Scoring 350 1627 742 
Myopic 
Defense 354 947 1398 
 
Applying the results from this table to Equation 9 for Table 17, yields    𝐴𝐶 =
908+1627+1398
8,047
= 0.4898 .  This percentage is still larger than each MDA accuracy; 
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however, this percentage, again is lower than the 8k sample trained MDA classifier.  
Furthermore, the time to complete training, testing and validation is 413.31 s, which is 
much longer than MDA and random forests with 8k samples.  Table 18 illustrates the 
random forests classifier performance with ~130k samples. 
Table 18:  Confusion matrix validation results on 20,756 samples from the MDA 
Classifier with all three targets and 129,724 samples. 
 
  Predicted Target 
  Random 
Myopic 
Scoring 
Myopic 
Defense 
A
ct
ua
l T
ar
ge
t Random 2731 2252 1865 
Myopic 
Scoring 1328 4035 1608 
Myopic 
Defense 1297 2156 3484 
 
Applying the results from this table to Equation 9 for Table 18, yields  𝐴𝐶 =
2731+4035+3484
20,756
= 0.4938 .  These data show that there is a slight improvement over the 
50k sample training set; however, this improvement is not higher than running 8k 
samples.  The time to complete this process is also much higher than >413.31 s, which is 
the time to run the 50k data set. 
Classifier Selection. 
Both classifiers have a higher accuracy with a low sample count.     Training and 
validating with more samples takes much longer while running both classifiers; however, 
the random forests classifier takes much longer than the MDA classifier to run its 
training/validation process.  For 8k data samples, MDA takes 0.50 ms to complete the 
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validation process while it takes random forests over 35 s.  This shows that even though 
random forests produce a higher classification accuracy with less data, it takes 70 times 
longer to obtain this result.  Furthermore, the random forests classifier only gains a 10% 
advantage over MDA and MDA’s classification accuracy for three classes is still greater 
than the prior probability of  1
3
 .  70 times longer training, testing and validating time is 
not worth the 10% gain in percentage; therefore, based on these findings and the amount 
of simulations from the levels and factors of testing, MDA is chosen to complete the 
opponent model data collection. 
Opponent Model Value Assessment  
 
The opponent model value is assessed in two different conditions.  The first 
condition is with perfect information, (as described in quadrants 1 and 2 of Table 6).  
Perfect information provides data on the upper bound value that the opponent modeler 
provides.  These two quadrants show the possibility of gaining value against the Nash 
Equilibrium player while competing against three static targets.  Next the value of the 
model is evaluated in an imperfect information environment (for quadrants 3 and 4).  
This environment demonstrates the actual upper bound value of the game.  Each quadrant 
represents 50,400 games played with EM and M* against each target. 
 All values in each table are tested for statistical significance in accordance with 
calculations described in Chapter 3.  The two tailed binary test shows significance for the 
win/tie total data.  Its null hypothesis states that there is no difference in win/tie 
percentage between M* and EM.  The alternative hypothesis states that there is a lower or 
higher difference in win/tie percentage.  The one-tailed difference of means test is applied 
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to the score differential data.  The null hypothesis of this test states that the difference of 
means between M* and EM is less than or equal to zero, while the alternative states that 
the difference of means is greater than zero.  All significant values are computed with a 
95% confidence interval.  Cells with statistically insignificant values are shaded gray.   
Perfect Information. 
The data in Table 19 and Table 20 illustrate the upper bound expected value gains 
of the opponent model.  The first three columns represent the expected value gains of the 
opponent modeler against all three targets.  The bottom row shows the classification 
accuracy of the model M* employs.  Since M* receives target predictions from the oracle 
in quadrant one, the prediction accuracy is 1.00 for all three targets. 
Table 19:  Mean per-game score differentials between the oracle and Expectimax for 
each target for 50,400 games in a fully observable environment with a target oracle. 
Targets Random Myopic Scoring 
Myopic 
Defense 
Decision 
Engine 
M*  
(Oracle) Expectimax 
M* 
 (Oracle) Expectimax 
M*  
(Oracle) Expectimax 
Fully 
Observable 1.869 1.982 1.388 1.269 1.633 1.474 
EVGscore ∆ -0.113 0.120 0.159 
Prediction 
Accuracy 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
Table 19 illustrates the upper bound expected value gain score value for all 
50,400 games.  Since there is perfect state information and the search reaches the leaf 
nodes of the tree, Expectimax performs at its best.  Furthermore, M* operates at its best 
with a known state and target strategy.  This table represents the environment in which 
there exists perfect information in state and target strategy; therefore both engines are 
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functioning at their highest aptitude.  With both engines playing at their best, this 
quadrant displays (given a specific target) if it is possible for M* to outplay the EM 
engine. 
All players except for the random target contribute a gain for the M* engine.  
Characteristics of the random player involve making unpredictable moves.  Furthermore, 
the M* algorithm’s performance depends on making move predictions.  These 
predictions prune parts of the tree in which it assumes that the target will not play.  
Incorrect information causes M* to make the wrong decision and traverse the wrong 
nodes.  The EM engine makes decisions based on playing a Nash Equilibrium opponent, 
which means that it examines all plays the opponent can take and expects its opponent to 
make an optimal move.  In short EM is expected to make a better decision than M* 
assuming M* obtains an incorrect target prediction. Table 20 displays the highest 
potential gain of win/tie totals between the EM and M* decision engines.  The scoring 
target is positive, which shows that Expectimax loses 466 more games than the M* agent 
in this quadrant. Expectimax also loses 352 more games playing against the defense 
target.  This means that M* has the potential gain of these values in the other three 
quadrants. The random target value is insignificant.   
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Table 20: Total win and tie mean differences between oracle and Expectimax for each 
target in a fully observable environment with a target oracle. 
Targets Random Myopic Scoring 
Myopic 
Defense 
Decision 
Engine 
M* 
 (Oracle) Expectimax 
M* 
(Oracle) Expectimax 
M* 
(Oracle) Expectimax 
Fully 
Observable 34,107 34,031 32,209 31,743 33,257 32,905 
EVGwins/ties 76 466 352 
Prediction 
Accuracy 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Table 21 and Table 22 illustrate the actual value for double-3 dominoes with 
perfect state information with the opponent model containing an MDA classifier trained 
and validated with 8k samples.  The one-versus-rest (offline) prediction accuracy for the 
MDA is 45%.  Table 21 shows the actual value in score differentials and Table 22 
illustrates the actual value in wins over the Expectimax.  Furthermore, these tables show 
the actual on-line prediction accuracy against all three targets.  
Table 21:  Mean per-game score differentials between oracle and Expectimax for each 
target in a fully observable environment with an opponent model. 
Targets Random Myopic Scoring Myopic Defense 
Decision 
Engine 
M* 
 (OM) Expectimax 
M*  
(OM) Expectimax 
M* 
(OM) Expectimax 
Fully 
Observable 1.984 1.982 1.143 1.269 1.517 1.474 
EVGscore ∆ 0.002 -0.126 0.043 
Prediction 
Accuracy 0.316 0.465 0.336 
 
All expected value gains in Table 21 are statistically insignificant.  The actual 
prediction accuracy for the defensive target is 0.336 which is slightly higher than the 
prior percentage (of a random guess) but much lower than 1.00.  The prediction accuracy 
for the myopic scoring agent is much higher than the prior probability of 1/3; however it 
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still does not help M* enough to produce a gain against EM.  Furthermore, the random 
target prediction accuracy is lower than the prior probability.  This shows that the 
classifier selects (or classifies) the myopic scoring target over the other two targets.  
Table 22, illustrates the actual values with total wins and ties.   
Table 22:  Total win and tie mean differences between oracle and Expectimax for each 
target in a fully observable environment with an opponent model.   
Targets Random Myopic Scoring 
Myopic 
Defense 
Decision 
Engine 
M* 
(OM) Expectimax 
M* 
(OM) Expectimax 
M*  
(OM) Expectimax 
Fully 
Observable 34,212 34,031 31,345 31,743 32,988 32,905 
EVGwins/ties 181 -398 83 
Prediction 
Accuracy 0.316 0.465 0.336 
 
Table 22 illustrates the gain in win/tie totals for M* with perfect state and 
imperfect target identity (action) information.  The imperfect action information affects 
the myopic scoring win/tie differentials with a loss of 864 more games than quadrant 1.  
The Myopic defense and random targets produce insignificant gains with the information 
provided. 
Holding the state information constant allows the study of how much affect 
prediction accuracy has on performance.  The M* decision engine makes optimal 
decisions based on the target information it receives.  These data show that with 
prediction dropping from 1.00 to less than 0.50 the M* decision engine performs with 
lower gains than with perfect target identity information.  Therefore, this depicts that this 
drop in action information contributes to the loss in score differential and win/loss gains.  
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Imperfect Information.  
Games played with imperfect state information are shown in Table 23 through 
Table 26.   These games are played with an environment identical to regular play 
(assuming the target type is known).  Quadrant three shows games in which state 
information is imperfect while the target type is known.  Quadrant four illustrates the 
results for imperfect target information and state.   
Table 23:  Mean per-game score differentials between M*(oracle) and Expectimax for 
each target under imperfect information in a partially observable environment with a 
target oracle. 
Targets Random Myopic Scoring 
Myopic 
Defense 
Decision 
Engine 
M* 
 (Oracle) Expectimax 
M*  
(Oracle) Expectimax 
M* 
(Oracle) Expectimax 
Fully 
Observable 1.556 1.526 0.763 0.726 1.027 0.914 
EVGscore ∆ 0.030 0.037 0.113 
Prediction 
Accuracy 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
Table 23 illustrates games with imperfect state but the target type is known.  
Holding the target oracle constant allows for the comparison of how partial observability 
affects the score difference EVG.  Since the oracle perfectly predicts the target for M* in 
this quadrant, M* is able to gain an advantage over the Nash Equilibrium agent. The 
myopic defense provides the largest gain for this table with 0.113.  This value is down 
0.46 from the potential gain of 0.159 shown in results from Table 23.  This shows that the 
imperfect state has an effect on the amount of gain M* provides over the Nash 
Equilibrium player.  The other two target values provide insignificant gains.  Table 24 
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illustrates the expected value gain for the number of wins/ties with imperfect state 
information and a target oracle. 
 
Table 24:  Win and tie totals between M*(oracle) and Expectimax for each target in a 
partially observable environment with a target oracle. 
Targets Random Myopic Scoring 
Myopic 
Defense 
Decision 
Engine 
M* 
 (Oracle) Expectimax 
M*  
(Oracle) Expectimax 
M* 
(Oracle) Expectimax 
Fully 
Observable 32,962 32,887 29,759 29,708 30,988 30,688 
EVGwins/ties 75 51 310 
Prediction  
Accuracy 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
 These data show that there is potential to win and/or tie 310 more games than the 
Nash Equilibrium agent in a partially observable environment for the myopic defense 
target.  The other target values are insignificant in this quadrant.   
Actual Value Evaluation 
 
Table 25 and Table 26 illustrates the opponent model’s actual value table for the 
data taken in all 50,400 starting states using both imperfect state information and an 
imperfect opponent classifier used with M*.    These data show the real world 
environment in which dominoes games take place.  Furthermore, these tables illustrate 
how the M* algorithm fares against a Nash equilibrium player in the environment when 
playing against three different target types.  
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Table 25:  Mean per-game score differentials between M*(OM) and Expectimax for each 
target in a partially observable environment with an opponent model. 
𝑻𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒆𝒕𝒔 Random Myopic Scoring 
Myopic 
Defense 
Decision 
Engine 
M* 
 (OM) Expectimax 
M*  
(OM) Expectimax 
M* 
(OM) Expectimax 
Fully 
Observable 1.507 1.526 0.761 0.726 .988 0.914 
AVGscore ∆ -0.019 0.035 0.074 
Predict Acc. 0.272 0.627 0.170 
 
Table 25 shows that the best performance gain for the M* decision engine when 
compared with a Nash equilibrium player, occurs against the myopic defense target (with 
a 0.074 actual value).  This shows that in a real world environment the M* decision 
engine has an actual gain of .074 points than the Nash equilibrium.  The other two targets 
show insignificant gains.  Table 26 illustrates how many games M* wins or ties over 
Expectimax. 
Table 26:  Win and tie total difference between M*(OM) and Expectimax for each target 
in a partially observable environment with an opponent model. 
𝑻𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒆𝒕𝒔 Random Myopic Scoring 
Myopic 
Defense 
Decision 
Engine 
M* 
 (OM) Expectimax 
M*  
(OM) Expectimax 
M* 
(OM) Expectimax 
Fully 
Observable 32,205 32,887 29,717 29,708 30,846 30,688 
EVGwins/ties -682 9 158 
Predict Acc. 0.272 0.627 0.170 
 
These data show that there is no significant gain in games over the Nash 
Equilibrium agent when playing against the three targets.  The prediction accuracy of this 
data set is the lowest with the myopic defense target.  This shows that (while holding 
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imperfect information as a constant from quadrant 3 to 4), lowering the prediction 
accuracy to under 1.00 affects the performance of the M* engine.   
The highest prediction accuracy is attributed to the myopic scoring agent.  This 
value of 0.627 shows that the MDA classifier predicts the scoring target more often than 
the other two targets; however this is not enough to gain value over the Nash equilibrium 
agent.  
Against the random agent, M* produces a significant loss of 682 games in 
comparison with the Nash Equilibrium agent.  The random agent has an unpredictable 
strategy.  Furthermore, M* relies on a known target type and strategy to perform well.  
The lack of a deterministic strategy to make decisions causes M* to play sub-optimal 
games.  Expectimax is able to make optimal moves without a strategy based on its 
expectation of the target to play optimally.  This explains why the Nash Equilibrium 
agent is expected to win more games against the random target. 
Summary of Results 
 
The total expect value gain in the first quadrant is 0.159.  This value drops in the 
second quadrant due to the lack of perfect target knowledge.  The same observation 
occurs with the myopic scoring expected value gain.  Even with an opponent modeler 
with a 46% prediction accuracy, this gain is insignificant.   
The partial observable quadrants show that there is potential to score a gain of 
0.113 over the Nash Equilibrium player with the myopic defense target. The other two 
values are insignificant in the third quadrant.  The end results show that in the last 
quadrant, there is still a statistically significant value gained over the Nash equilibrium 
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agent of 0.74 by the M* agent with the opponent modeler while playing against the 
defense agent.   
The Defense target demonstrates a 352 game advantage over the Nash 
equilibrium player in the perfect information environment playing with a target oracle; 
however, this gain is lost when applying the opponent modeler at a 33.6% prediction 
accuracy.  Similar to these results, the third quadrant of data illustrates a potential gain of 
310 games over the NE player.  The prediction accuracy is much lower in the fourth 
quadrant at 17%. This lower prediction shows to affect the M*’s ability to make good 
decisions and win more games. 
In summary, the data show that the M* decision engine with an opponent modeler 
is able to score higher than the Nash Equilibrium agent.  It also has the potential to win 
more games.  The opponent modeler’s accuracy has an effect on how many games the 
M* player wins as well as how many points it scores.  Chapter 5 provides conclusions of 
this thesis research and future work that can add advancement to this research topic. 
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V.  Conclusions and Future Work 
Based on the results of characterizing relative performance improvement over the 
Nash Equilibrium solution for three types of dominoes-playing opponents, applying M* 
search with an opponent model shows promise as long as the model has a high quality 
prediction of board state information (to include what is in the other player’s hand and 
what dominos are in the boneyard).  This chapter summarizes the findings in the data and 
explains where research can further explore this topic. 
This research shows results for the M* decision engine with a 100% prediction 
accuracy and prediction accuracy less than 100%.  Quadrants 1 and 3 contain potential 
values to be achieved by the opponent modeler.  The lower percentages produce lower 
actual results in quadrants 2 and 4.  This means that potential exists for M* win or tie 
more games than a Nash equilibrium player against specific targets. 
The myopic scoring and random targets provide negative or insignificant gains for 
the opponent modeler.  There is potential (from quadrant 1) for the M* search engine to 
have significant gain over Expectimax; however, data show that prediction accuracy of 
the opponent modeler is not good enough to predict the correct target and make an 
optimal decision.  The random target’s contribution to expected and actual gains are 
insignificant to negative, showing that M* has no potential to gain an advantage over the 
Nash Equilibrium player if the target plays a random strategy. 
In conclusion, applying an opponent modeler has potential to add value to an 
agent in double three dominoes for specific opponent types.  If the opponent plays a 
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random strategy, there is no potential.  The accuracy of the opponent modeler has a big 
effect on the way the algorithm makes decisions, even if the opponent classification 
accuracy is over 50% (as shown by the scoring target in the fourth quadrant).  The next 
section explains future work that can help to further this research path. 
Future Work 
Future work for this research topic involve areas where improvements can be 
made with the M* search parameters such as the opponent model and the state provided.  
These parameters can be tuned in order to close the gap between the oracle results and the 
opponent classifier results.  The first area for improvement involves adding an opponent 
modeler for the state of the game.  The next chapter discusses playing against non-
myopic targets.  Then it presents a brief discussion on adding a probability distribution 
over all M* targets decisions and choosing the decision with the highest value.  Lastly 
discussed is applying an online learning module to the classifier in order to learn as the 
agent plays. 
Opponent Modeler for Board State.  
The data show that the value of the opponent modeler is higher in a fully 
observable environment.  Revealing information about the state of the game to the 
decision agent allows it to make better choices.  Therefore adding an opponent modeler 
for state information will provide better results for the opponent modeler if applied to the 
M* search.  
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Non-Myopic Targets. 
Another area to explore is non-myopic targets.  These targets are in line with 
Carmel and Markovitch’s research [6].  Their research explores fully observable games 
where players assume the opponent’s termination condition as well as the evaluation 
function of the opponent.  Applying this concept to a partially observable game means 
that both players will have to model each other and have some intelligence of the board 
state. 
Applying a Probability Distribution Model to the OM. 
The opponent modeling paradigm applied in this thesis performs a three-way 
classification and picks the most likely opponent from the set of three.  In this thesis, M* 
assumes there is only one possible opponent type with certainty.  By altering the output 
of the opponent-modeling classifier to yield a probability distribution over all possible 
targets, M* can form a strategy by selecting from a probabilistically-weighted best 
response to several target strategies instead of just one, whenever their predicted action 
would differ.     
Summary 
In conclusion, this research can be applied to applications that involve two or 
more players that have a desire to gain value in specific environments.  For fully 
observable games, modeling opponent’s actions and applying them to an M* style search 
method provides a player the ability to make better choices as long as the target’s strategy 
is predictable.   
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Appendix A. Rules of Dominoes 
According to Armanino [2], players randomly choose an equal set of two sided 
tiles of a 28 tile set.  Each side of the tiles contains values ranging from blank (or zero) to 
6, making each tile in the set unique.  Figure 18 shows a full set of 28 dominoes. 
 
Figure 18:  Full set of double-six dominoes (28 pieces). 
 
The object of the game is to match the sides of the dominoes with the dominoes on 
the board and be the first to achieve a predefined ending score.  Scoring is achieved by 
adding the horizontal and vertical ends of the dominoes on the table.  If the total is 
divisible by 5, that is a scoring play.  Figure 19 illustrates how moves are made between 
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the player and opponent in a simple game with three dominoes per participant
 
Figure 19:  Example 5 turn game 
 
As shown, the player scores twice in this game.  The first score of 15 is made by 
placing the (6|3) domino.  This domino produces a value of 3 on the outside right end, 
which adds to the value of 12 of the (6|6) domino on the left outside end.  The second 
score of 5 is made by the player placing (2|4) with a value of 2 on the left outside end 
adding to (6|3) with a value of 3 on the right side end.  Consequently, the opponent then 
takes advantage of this opportunity to score 10 points by placing the (6|5) on the top edge 
with the value of 5 exposed adding with the 2 and 3.  By placing the (4|1) instead of the 
(4|2), the player could have prevented the opponent from scoring.  In short, this instance 
demonstrates how easy scoring can occur as well as how a player can defend by playing 
the right dominoes at the right time.   
Additional rules state that the player whom achieves a “domino” [12], (plays all 
dominoes in that player’s hand first,) obtains an additional score:  the remaining pip 
(domino dot) total in his/her opponent’s hands.  Defensive play adds to the chance of 
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“dominoing” by preventing the opponent from playing all of their dominoes.  Defense is 
played by placing dominoes that cause the other player to pull from the boneyard.   
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